Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis (IDC) uses impossible differentials to discard wrong subkeys for the first or the last several rounds of block ciphers. Thus, the security of a block cipher against IDC can be evaluated by impossible differentials. This paper studies impossible differentials for Rijndael-like and 3D-like ciphers, we introduce methods to find 4-round impossible differentials of Rijndael-like ciphers and 6-round impossible differentials of 3D-like ciphers. Using our methods, various new impossible differentials of Rijndael and 3D could be searched out.
Introduction
Impossible differential cryptanalysis(IDC) was first proposed by Knudsen [14] and Biham [1] to attack DEAL and Skipjack. It is known as one of the most powerful attacks on block ciphers. This cryptanalysis has attracted wide attention and many good results are achieved [1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17] .
Compared with traditional differential cryptanalysis, IDC considers the differential characteristics with probability 0, when a pair of plaintexts satisfies the input difference of the characteristics, the difference of ciphertexts decrypted by the right subkey never satisfy the output difference of characteristics. By this way we can discard wrong subkeys and recover the right subkey. Impossible differential attack is composed of two steps: finding the longest characteristics and recovering the subkeys. Retrieving the characteristics often use the idea of "miss-in-the-middle", namely to find two differential characteristics with probability 1 from encryption and decryption, and connect them together when there are some inconsistencies in the middle. As is suggested by [4] , the key step of IDC is to retrieve the longest impossible differentials. In [4, 5] , two methods were provided to find impossible differentials of various block ciphers, but both of them have their limitations and some important inconsistencies are ignored [6] .
This paper focuses on finding new impossible differentials for two block ciphers: the Rijndael-like block ciphers and the 3D-like ciphers. The cipher Rijndael [7] was submitted to the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) and was later selected as the AES. Since its selection, Rijndael has received a great deal of attentions, both in block cipher design and cryptanalysis. In [9] , 4-round impossible differential of AES128 is detected for the first time, and this ID distinguisher was used in most later IDC results(e.g. in [2] and [17] ). And in [10] , some new impossible differentials of AES are searched out. In CANS 2008, the new iterated block cipher 3D [8] was designed inspired by AES. The novel design of 3D cipher also attracts some research interests: in 2010, Tang et al proposed a 6-round impossible differential of 3D cipher and attack 9-round 3D cipher [10] , then later in ISPEC 2011, Jorge launched a 10-round impossible differential attack by using new 6-round distinguisher of 3D cipher [15] , and Takuma et al presented 11-and 13-round attacks on 3D with the truncated differential cryptanalysis in [16] , now is approved to be the best attack on 3D.
Although impossible differential cryptanalysis does not give the best attack on these two ciphers [18, 16] , impossible differential properies still need to be sufficiently considered. Up to now, the longest impossible differential for AES-128 is still 4-round [9, 10] , while the longest impossible differential for 3D cipher is 6-round [11, 15] . In this paper, we will present new methods to find impossible differentials of these two structures. By applying our results, various new impossible differentials of these two block ciphers can be searched out.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic notions. In Section 3 and 4, we find various impossible differentials of these two structures. In Section 5, we draw conclusions.
Preliminaries
We will introduce some basic notations and definitions through this paper. 

, the differential probability of f is defined by [12] . (differential active S-box) A differential active S-box is defined as an S-box whose input difference is non-zero.
Brief Description of Rijndael-like Structure
The Rijndael-like structure operates on Like all other works on Rijndael cipher, we assume the last MC operation is omitted.
Brief Description of 3D-like Structure
The 3D-like structure also has an SPN structure, message block is represented as a 3-dimensional cube( nnn  state of words, see 
 is said to be the k -th vertical slice of the cube(see Fig. 1 ). ...
...
... The i-th round of 3D-like structure is composed of four operations: 
,
:,
For briefness, we call 1 Likewise, we omit the last  operation.
Retrieving Impossible Differentials for Rijndael-like Cipher
In this section, we will provide some 4-round impossible differentials for Rijndael-like structure by using the inconsistency of the MixColumn layer in the 2 nd round. The transformation we considered is
For the input state matrix Example 2. We choose input difference whose 0,3,5,9,10,14,15-th words are nonzero, and output difference whose 0,1,4,7,10,11,13,14-th words are nonzero, thus we can construct impossible differential 
via Corollary 1. We depict such impossible differential of Rijndael in Fig. 2 , where we ignore the KeyAddition operation since it does not affect the differential state.
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Fig. 2. A 4-round impossible differential of Rijndael denotes a nonzero difference, denotes a zero difference, denotes a difference affected
By observation, the impossible differentials proposed by [9] and [10] (see Fig.3 ) are special cases of ours. 4 -round ID [9] 4-round ID [10] 
Retrieving Impossible Differentials for 3D-like Cipher
In this section, we will provide some 6-round impossible differentials for 3D-like structure by using the inconsistency of the  layer in the 3 rd round function. The cipher which we study excludes the last  operation, i.e. , ,( ) mod : 0 1 
Definition 6(collection set of SBS). Let
hold synchronously, then
is a 6-round impossible differential of 3D-like cipher. Further, since
, then the active S-boxes in 
does not change the number of active S-boxes, we claim that state cube of 
{( , 
In the input differential cube of By observation, the impossible differential characteristics proposed by [11, 15] (see Fig.5 ) are special cases of Theorem 2.
6-round ID [15] 6-round ID [11] Fig. 5. Typical 6-round impossible differential of 3D in [11] and [15] 
Conclusions
Since IDC is very powerful in analyzing the security of block ciphers, it is worthwhile for us to evaluate the resistance of block cipher against IDC. The existence of impossible differentials is an evaluation of block cipher against IDC. This paper proposed methods to find impossible differentials of AES and 3D structures and lots of new impossible differentials could be searched out. Our work can be used as a tool to evaluate the vulnerability of new block ciphers employ these two structures against IDC. Although we are not sure that whether these new impossible differentials can improve attacks on AES and 3D, we hope this will be helpful in future. Chen-hui Jin was born in 1965. He is currently professor at the Information Science T echnology Institute. His current research interests are cryptography and information s ecurity.
